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Título: La confianza de los niños en el consenso depende del contexto: 
convencional vs. moral. 
Resumen: Cuando una mayoría aprueba una exclusión social ¿los niños 
son fieles a sus opiniones personales o muestran deferencia hacia la mayo-
ría? Teniendo en cuenta investigaciones previas sobre la preferencia de los 
niños por el testimonio de una mayoría de adultos frente al de un disidente 
cuando deben aprender palabras, en este trabajo se estudió esta preferencia 
por el consenso social en dos contextos: exclusión racial entre iguales y 
aprendizaje de palabras nuevas. El objetivo fue estudiar si la preferencia 
por la mayoría puede generalizarse a otros contextos. En este trabajo parti-
ciparon 90 niños de Educación Infantil del grupo étnico mayoritario en 
España. Los resultados mostraron que los niños se alineaban con la mayo-
ría significativamente menos en el contexto de exclusión que en el de 
aprendizaje de palabras. Además, rechazaban la opinión del consenso 
cuando este aprobaba la exclusión de un niño de una actividad grupal, in-
cluso cuando el excluido era de un grupo étnico-racial diferente al propio; 
por el contrario, los participantes se alineaban con el disidente que conde-
naba la exclusión, a pesar de que esto implicaba oponerse a la mayoría. Es-
tos resultados proporcionan información relevante sobre el desarrollo del 
conocimiento social infantil. 
Palabras clave: desarrollo social; desarrollo cognitivo; juicios morales; 
consenso social; testimonio. 
  Abstract: Do young children give priority to following personal beliefs 
over the testimony of a majority group of adults that approves of social 
exclusion? Following current research on children’s preference for non-
dissenters when learning the names for novel objects, this study investigat-
ed children’s preference for consensus opinion in two contexts: Interracial 
social exclusion among peers and novel object labeling. The goal was to 
examine the generalizability of preference for the opinion of non-
dissenters in a socially relevant context. This study was conducted with 90 
preschool children from the Spanish ethnic majority group. The findings 
revealed that participants sided with the consensus significantly less often 
in the social exclusion context than in the novel object labeling context. 
Moreover, young children did not defer to the opinion of a numerical con-
sensus in the socially meaningful context when a group condoned the ex-
clusion of a peer from a group activity, even when the peer was from an 
outgroup social category. Instead, participants agreed with a dissenter who 
claimed that it was not okay to exclude someone, despite the opposite 
opinion of a numerical majority. These results provide new information 
regarding children’s social knowledge development. 
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Cognitive developmental theories emphasize the role of the 
child in constructing his/her own knowledge through inter-
action and experience with the world and with other people 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Piaget, 1932, 1954). Yet, not all 
information can be learned first-hand, making the infor-
mation provided by others an important source of 
knowledge. Recently, developmental researchers have pro-
posed that others’ testimony is relevant as children learn and 
reason about the physical, natural, and social world. Recent 
studies have shown that children make use of direct infor-
mation from others when they acquire conventional 
knowledge in many social contexts (Harris, 2012; Jaswal, 
2010; Jaswal, Carrington, Setia, & Cole, 2010).  
One of the variables explored in previous research on in-
dividuals’ use of others’ testimony is the influence of consen-
sus. That is, previous research has investigated how individu-
als respond when most of the people in a group say the same 
thing or hold the same view. The influence of consensus tes-
timony on adults’ learning, decisions, and behavior has been 
studied extensively since Asch’s (1956) seminal work on con-
formity (Bond & Smith, 1996). Although studies with chil-
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dren are far less numerous than studies with adult partici-
pants, recent research has shown that young children, too, 
respond to consensus testimony. For example, young chil-
dren rely on information from three adults in consensus ra-
ther than a lone dissenting adult regarding the correct name 
for a novel object (Chen, Corriveau, & Harris, 2013; Cor-
riveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009; Fusaro & Harris, 2008). 
Likewise, related work on other conventional norms like 
forms of greeting, modes of dress, or classroom rules, has 
revealed that young children draw on social consensus when 
evaluating these rules, the reasons for them, and the conse-
quences of violating such conventional norms (see Smetana, 
Jambon, & Ball, 2014, for a review).  
Children also hear consensus testimony about issues that 
are not conventional in nature, however, and their use of 
group agreement to make decisions in these contexts is less 
well understood. For example, while social conventions --or 
conventional norms-- are evaluated as legitimate on the basis 
of consensus and authority mandates, norms pertaining to 
others’ welfare, fairness, and just treatment are viewed as re-
sulting not from consensus or authority but from an evalua-
tion of the intrinsic nature of an act, and the consequences 
to a victim (Nucci, 2001, 2002; Turiel, 1983, 1998). Research 
on moral judgment has shown that, by four years of age, 
children use different criteria and reasoning to evaluate con-
ventional and moral norms (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Nucci, 
2001; Turiel, 1983, 2002). Children view moral transgressions 
as wrong even when an adult or a consensus group condones 
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them, and view moral rules as unalterable regardless of group 
opinion (e.g., if a school decides to change the rule that “hit-
ting is wrong” children still deem it to be “not okay”). 
Many social interactions in young children’s lives require 
coordination of conventional knowledge about traditions and 
expectations with moral norms about the fair treatment of 
others. For example, social exclusion from groups is an ex-
tremely salient aspect of social life for young children. Alt-
hough preschoolers independently reason that exclusion 
based solely on gender or race is unfair by moral standards, 
such actions are sometimes deemed justifiable on the basis 
of conventional concerns about “fitting in” (Killen & Rut-
land, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2015). As one illustration, pre-
school aged children viewed it as unfair for a group of girls 
to exclude a boy from playing with dolls, or for a group of 
boys to exclude a girl from playing with trucks, even though 
most children recognize and condone gender-segregated ac-
tivities (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). If there is only 
room for one child to play, however, young children often 
choose the gender-stereotypic peer (i.e., a girl to play with 
dolls or a boy to play with trucks), and reason about who is 
likely to fit in best with the group and activity (Theimer et al., 
2001). Thus, instances of social exclusion invoke both moral 
issues of fairness and others’ welfare as well as conventional 
issues of customs and expectations for children. 
Given that children consider both conventional norms 
and moral norms when making decisions in social contexts, 
the first aim of this project was to test the contextual speci-
ficity of children’s use of consensus opinion. To achieve this, 
children’s reliance on consensus testimony was tested in two 
contexts, one related to the fair treatment of peers in an in-
terracial social exclusion context (socially relevant context) 
and one related to novel object labeling. The second context 
was based on that explored in previous work on children’s 
use of consensus testimony (Chen, Corriveau, & Harris, 
2011; Chen et al. 2013). The first context drew on research 
examining children’s moral reasoning regarding intergroup 
social exclusion (Killen & Rutland, 2011). For both contexts, 
we measured children’s judgments and reasoning when the 
opinions of a group consensus and one dissenter contrasted.  
We propose that children’s use of consensus testimony is 
contextual (not domain-general), and comprises one of many 
sources of information that children use to form judgments 
and make decisions. As well, children bring their own cogni-
tive and social-cognitive interpretations of events in the 
world to bear on their judgments in social contexts. Accord-
ingly, we hypothesized that, due to the different nature of 
each context, children would be more likely to side with the 
consensus in the conventional labeling context than in the 
social exclusion context. Specifically, the social exclusion 
context involved making a judgment about an act with nega-
tive intrinsic consequences to another person, which has 
been shown to be resilient to authority mandates in previous 
research (Smetana, 1985). Based on previous studies on chil-
dren’s moral judgments about social exclusion, we predicted 
that in the peer exclusion context, in which the group con-
sensus approved of the exclusion while the dissenter disap-
proved of it, children would side with the dissenter (who said 
that exclusion was wrong or “not okay”). Thus, children 
would give priority to following personal moral beliefs over 
the testimony of others who approve of social exclusion. Re-
garding the object labeling (conventional) context, we pre-
dicted that preschoolers would defer to the opinion of the 
consensus, as has been shown in previous work (Chen et al., 
2011; 2013).  
An additional novel dimension of the present research 
involved measuring young children’s reasoning for their de-
cisions in both the object labeling and evaluation of peer so-
cial exclusion contexts (i.e., why they agreed with the opinion 
of either the consensus or the dissenter). It has recently been 
suggested that the importance of whether children under-
stand their informants’ reasons for giving testimony has been 
underestimated (Koenig, 2012), and children’s reasons for 
trusting in or doubting their informants should be further 
explored (Mills, 2013). Extensive research on children’s mor-
al development indicates that children as young as 3 years of 
age reason about why behavior is acceptable or unacceptable 
from a moral viewpoint with references to fairness, equality, 
and empathy (see Smetana, et al., 2014, for a review), and 
some previous research on children’s trust in testimony sug-
gests that young children can reason about informant accu-
racy (Einav & Robinson, 2010; Fitneva & Dunfield, 2010; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005). However, because no studies on 
children’s use of testimony in object labeling contexts have 
systematically examined young children’s reasons for their 
decisions, expectations for this context were limited to the 
presence or absence of verbal justifications related to the 
opinion of the group consensus.  
For the object labeling context, we predicted that, if chil-
dren sided with the consensus, they would reference the 
presence of a group consensus; otherwise they would justify 
their elections with reference to their own ideas. In contrast, 
previous work on young children’s evaluations of social ex-
clusion allowed for more detailed hypotheses for this con-
text. We used the framework of social domain theory, which 
identifies three domains (moral, societal, and psychological) 
as central to social evaluations of complex events including 
interracial social exclusion (Turiel, 2002). When asked for 
their explanations for their decisions, we predicted that, in 
the social exclusion context, preschoolers would reference 
their perceptions of social exclusion as morally wrong, using 
reasons pertaining to unfairness and harm to others. Because 
children were not provided with other contextual infor-
mation about exclusion other than the race of the excluded 
target, we expected a predominant use of moral justifica-
tions, rather than a range of moral, conventional, and per-
sonal choice reasons which would be expected in multi-
faceted social exclusion contexts. 
Additionally, this study expanded on recent research as-
sessing the impact of informant racial group membership on 
children’s use of others’ testimony by varying the race of the 
dissenter (Black, White) and holding constant the race of the 
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consensus group (White). Thus, in addition to our hypothe-
ses about the influence of a numerical social consensus in 
object labeling and interracial social exclusions contexts, this 
study also explored the relevance of racial/ethnic group 
membership of the informants on young children’s decisions 
in both contexts. Research on racial/ethnic group identifica-
tion in young children has found that, from 3-4 years of age, 
children in racial/ethnic majority groups typically express a 
same-race (or “ingroup”) preference, and implicit bias to-
wards individuals from other groups (“outgroups”) usually 
appears around 6 years of age as children gain knowledge 
about racial/ethnic stereotypes (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 
2006; Enesco, Lago, Rodríguez, & Guerrero, 2011; Rutland, 
Cameron, Bennett, & Ferrell; 2005).  
However, when other social factors are present, such as 
issues of unfairness, children do not consistently make deci-
sions based on ingroup bias (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Young 
children often give priority to fairness or equality (for a gen-
eral review of the development of prejudice see Levy & 
Killen, 2008; Guerrero, Enesco & Pons, 2011). Thus, exam-
ining the role of consensus in intergroup contexts regarding 
issues such as social exclusion is warranted. Related work has 
found that children prefer to learn new names for objects 
and the functions of new objects from people from their 
own linguistic or racial/ethnic group rather than from people 
from other groups (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; 
Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010). These results have been in-
terpreted in terms of young children’s ingroup bias (or pref-
erence for members of their ingroup over members of out-
groups). However, race/ethnicity is not always a salient vari-
able when a numerical consensus is present (e.g.: Chen, et al., 
2011 for object labeling/word learning). In the current study, 
the race of the numerical consensus was held constant (in-
group: White), and the race of the single dissenter was varied 
(ingroup, outgroup). To simplify the design, all participants 
were White (the racial/ethnic majority group).  
We predicted that in the social exclusion context, chil-
dren would agree with the dissenter (who advocated a non-
prejudiced behavior) rather than the group consensus (who 
advocated a prejudiced behavior) regardless of the race of 
their informants, given previous findings with older children 
who viewed racial exclusion as unfair and were willing to 
challenge peers who supported racial exclusion (Killen & 
Stangor, 2001). While previous studies on object labeling 
have found that consensus preference is more pronounced 
when the race of the consensus group matches that of the 
child (Chen, et al., 2011, 2013), we did not make a specific 
prediction about the role of the race of dissenter in this con-
text given that we did not have a specific prediction regard-






Participants were 90 preschool children (Mage = 57 
months, age range: 45-71 months, 45 females) from the 
Spanish ethnic majority group. Children were recruited from 
public and semi-private schools. The socioeconomic level of 
the participants was not individually measured, but we se-
lected schools situated in residential areas of average socio-
economic level in Madrid, Burgos, and Toledo, Spain. Writ-
ten parental consent, as well as children’s verbal assent, was 
obtained for all participants.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants viewed photographs featuring a three-person 
consensus and a dissenter, and were asked with whom they 
agreed in two different contexts: 1) interracial social exclu-
sion, and 2) novel object labeling (see Figure 1). 
All informants were young, female, had similar body 
types, presented neutral facial expressions, and were photo-
graphed wearing white T-shirts and blue jeans with loose hair 
away from their faces. The four informants were shown in a 
photo, in which one individual (the dissenter) stood a few 
feet away from the other three individuals (the consensus 
group). In each photo, three women (the consensus) stood 
together with one of their arms down, pointing at one of the 
two stimuli (an object in the object labeling context or a 
smiling/sad face in the social exclusion context) and the 
woman alone (the dissenter) stood pointing at the opposite 
stimuli.  
Conditions (race of dissenter). Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of two conditions. In the same-race condition, 
three White informants formed the group consensus. The 
dissenter was also White. In the different-race condition, three 
White informants formed the group consensus. The dissent-
er was Black. The location of the dissenter (to the left or to 
the right of the group consensus) varied systematically across 
participants, in order to avoid side bias or any pattern of re-
sponse based on the position of informants. 
Interracial social exclusion context. Participants completed 
two trials. Children were asked about their evaluations of in-
stances of interracial social exclusion (“okay” or “not okay”) 
when a group consensus shared their opinion that such ex-
clusion was “okay” and one dissenter shared her opinion that 
it was “not okay”.  
n the first trial, participants viewed a drawing depicting 
three White children at a birthday party, and a Black child 
sitting outside the house looking inside. The race of the chil-
dren depicted in the cartoons was never mentioned. The ex-
perimenter said: “Look what happened here. Ana [experi-
menter points to one of the characters presented in the 
drawing] has invited some kids to her birthday party but she 
didn’t invite Rosa [experimenter points to the excluded girl]. 
And  we  asked  these  girls  about what Ana did. These girls  
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Figure 1. Example of stimuli shown to children on a computer screen, re-
garding the labeling context (1) and the social exclusion context (2). 
 
said that it was okay [experimenter points to the consensus 
formation and the happy face]; and this girl said that it was 
not okay [experimenter points to the dissenter and the sad 
face]. So, what do you think? Is it okay or not okay that Ana 
didn’t invite Rosa to her birthday party? You think it was 
okay/not okay that she did that. Why do you think it was 
okay/not okay that Ana didn’t invite Rosa to her birthday 
party?” In this context, the informants from the group con-
sensus pointed at a smiling face (indicating ‘it is okay to not 
invite Rosa’) and the dissenter pointed at a sad face (indicat-
ing ‘it is not okay to not invite Rosa’).  
In the second trial for this context, participants viewed a 
drawing depicting three White children playing on a play-
ground on the monkey bars. A Black child was sitting on the 
side, looking at the group but not playing with anyone. The 
experimenter said: “Look what happened here. Clara [exper-
imenter points to one of the characters presented in the 
drawing] is playing on the monkey bars with her friends, but 
she didn’t let María join them [experimenter points to the 
excluded girl]. And we asked these girls about what Clara 
did. These girls said that it was okay [experimenter points to 
the consensus formation and the happy face]; and this girl 
said that it was not okay [experimenter points to the dissent-
er and the sad face]. So, what do you think? Is it okay or not 
okay that Clara didn’t let María play with them on the mon-
key bars? You think it was okay/not okay that she did that. 
Why do you think it was okay/not okay that Clara didn’t let 
María play with them on the monkey bars?” Again, the in-
formants from the group consensus pointed to a smiling face 
(‘okay’) and the dissenter pointed to a sad face (‘not okay’). 
The characters and names used in the stories matched the 
gender of the participant. In both trials participants made 
their decisions with the photographs of the informants in 
plain sight. 
Novel object labeling context. Participants completed two tri-
als. In the first trial, participants viewed two photographs, 
each featuring four female informants and two novel objects 
positioned on a table in front of them. The experimenter 
said: “We have asked these girls which one of these is a Reso, 
and here’s what they said. These girls said that this is a Reso 
[experimenter points to the consensus formation and object 
A] and this girl said that this is a Reso [experimenter points to 
the dissenter and object B]. So, which one do you think is 
the Reso? And, why do you think that’s the Reso?” The same 
procedure was conducted for the second trial (Teno). Both 
Reso and Teno are pseudo (made up) words. In both trials, 
participants made their decisions with the photographs of 
the informants in plain sight. 
Presentation order. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two orders of stimulus presentation. In Order 1, chil-
dren completed the first novel object labeling scenario trial 
(Reso), followed by the first social exclusion scenario trial 
(Birthday Party), followed by the second novel object labeling 
scenario trial (Teno) and concluding with the second social 
exclusion scenario trial (Monkey Bars). In Order 2, children 
started with the first social exclusion scenario trial (Birthday 
Party), followed by the first novel object labeling scenario tri-
al (Reso), followed by the second social exclusion scenario tri-
al (Monkey Bars) and concluding with the second novel object 
labeling scenario trial (Teno). 
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Response Coding and Reliability  
 
Judgments. Participants’ dichotomous responses across tri-
als within the same context (i.e., across both social exclusion 
trials and both novel object labeling trials) were compared 
using McNemar tests. No significant differences were found 
between agreement with the group consensus in Trial One 
and Trial Two within-context (for social exclusion: Birthday 
Party, Monkey Bars; and for novel object labeling: Reso, Teno). 
Thus, for all analyses, participants’ dichotomous responses to 
the two trials were scored on a 2-point scale within context: 
score = 0 when participants agreed with the dissenter twice; 
score = 1 when participants agreed once with the dissenter 
and once with the consensus; and score = 2 when partici-
pants agreed with the consensus twice. 
Justifications. Participants’ open-ended justifications for 
their decisions in the interracial social exclusion context 
(“Why do you think it’s okay/not okay that X didn’t invite Y 
to his/her birthday party/that X didn’t let Y play with them 
on the monkey bars?”) were coded into four categories for 
analyses. Content categories were based on previous studies 
on social exclusion drawing on social domain theory (Killen 
& Rutland, 2011). The categories were: 1) Fairness and sharing 
(e.g., ‘‘It’s not fair that he didn’t get to play”, “Everyone is 
entitled to play”, “It’s not fair that he didn’t invite him”), 2) 
Empathy (e.g., ‘‘Then she might cry”, “He would be bored 
and sad”), 3) Punishment, authority and conventions (e.g., ‘‘Be-
cause your mom says that you must invite Rosa’’), and 4) un-
differentiated or circular responses with no additional rea-
sons (e.g., “I don’t know’’, “Because she was not invited”). 
No participants mentioned the opinion or testimony of the 
consensus as a criterion for their decision in the evaluation 
of social exclusion context, and no participants referenced 
the race of the dissenter when justifying their decision in ei-
ther context. Only one (out of the 90 participants) gave justi-
fications from two different content categories (e.g., fairness 
and empathy), and in this case only the first response was 
coded.  
For the novel object labeling task (“Why do you think 
that’s the Reso/Teno?”) participants’ justifications were coded 
into three content categories: 1) Physical/visible attributes of the 
object (e.g., ‘‘It is red”, “It has a circle”), 2) Influence of the consen-
sus (e.g., ‘‘There are more people pointing at it”), and 3) un-
differentiated or circular responses with no additional rea-
sons (e.g., “I don’t know’’, “Because it is a Reso”).  
The coding of all justifications was conducted by two 
coders blind to the hypotheses of the study. On the basis of 
25% of the interviews (n = 23 data points), inter-rater relia-






Preliminary tests for differences in children’s responses 
by gender (boy, girl) and by order of task presentation (Or-
der 1, Order 2, as above) were performed. No significant dif-
ferences were found in any of the comparisons. Consequent-
ly, gender and presentation order were pooled in all analyses.  
A 2 (Race of Dissenter: White, Black) X 2 (Context: 
Novel Object Labeling, Social Exclusion Evaluation) ANO-
VA was conducted with repeated measures on the last factor. 
A main effect was found for context, F (1, 88) = 117.24, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .57, revealing that participants sided with the con-
sensus significantly less often in the social exclusion evalua-
tion context (M = .08, SD = .34) than in the novel object la-
beling context (M = 1.09, SD = .80). No other effects (for 
race of dissenter) were significant. 
Additional tests were conducted in order to compare 
children’s responses in the social exclusion evaluation and 
novel object labeling contexts against chance, which was cal-
culated to be a score of 1 out of a possible total of 2 (for 
each context). Participants displayed a systematic opposition 
to the testimony of the majority in the evaluation of social 
exclusion context (‘it is okay to not invite X’), siding with the 
dissenter who said it was “not okay” on average at a rate that 
significantly exceeded what would be expected by chance, 
t(89) = -25.53, p = .001, (M = .08, SD = .34). Across both 
scenarios (Birthday Party, Monkey Bars), only 3.3% of par-
ticipants (n = 3) agreed with the consensus once and only 
2.2% (n = 2) agreed twice; the rest of the participants (n = 
85, 94.4%) never agreed with the consensus in this context 
(see Figure 2).  
In the novel object labeling context, participants’ prefer-
ence for the testimony of the consensus versus the dissenter 
did not differ significantly from chance, t(89) = 1.05, p = .30, 
(M = 1.09, SD = .80). Across both scenarios (Reso, Teno), 
36.7% of participants (n = 33) agreed with the consensus 
twice, 35.6% (n = 32) agreed once, and 27.8% (n = 22) never 
agreed with the consensus (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of children siding with the majority always, once or never, by context. 
 
Our hypotheses for the evaluation of social exclusion 
context were supported: Children did not automatically side 
with the opinion of the consensus. Instead, they were against 
the majority, agreeing with the dissenter’s testimony that so-
cial exclusion was not acceptable, and this decision did not 
vary by the race of the informants. Our findings for the nov-
el object labeling context revealed that children did not pre-
fer consensus testimony, instead they were equally likely to 
agree with the dissenter as with the consensus in this context, 
and did so regardless of the race of the informants. 
 
Justifications for Decisions 
 
In the social exclusion context, where the vast majority 
of children sided with the dissenter’s claim that social exclu-
sion was “not okay”, over 50% of codable justifications ref-
erenced fairness or empathy for the excluded child. In the 
novel object labeling context, the majority of children’s justi-
fications were related to physical attributes of the object (e.g., 
color, shape) regardless of whether they had sided with the 
consensus (61.2% “physical attributes”) or the dissenter 
(68.3% “physical attributes”) testimony. Among the children 
who sided with the consensus, 14.3% justified their decision 
with reference to the group consensus.  
Table 1 displays children’s explanations for their deci-
sions in both contexts, split by whether they agreed with the 
consensus or the dissenter. Because children were asked to 
explain their decision in each trial, the number of responses 
in these tables is greater than the number of participants for 
each context. Several children were unable to give any justifi-
cation; 28.1% in the novel object labeling context and 40.7% 
in the evaluation of peer social exclusion context; but the 
rest of the sample gave some reason for their election.  
 
Table 1. Number of Justifications for Decisions to Side with the Consen-
sus or the Dissenter by Context (Percentages in Parentheses). 
  Social Exclusion Context 
  
Consensus 
(n = 7) 
Dissenter 
(n = 173) 
Fairness, Sharing, and Empathy  1 (14.3) 99 (57.2) 
Punishment, Authority, and Conventions  2 (28.6) 7 (4.1) 
Undifferentiated  4 (57.1) 67 (38.7) 
  Labeling Context 
  
Consensus 
(n = 98) 
Dissenter 
(n = 82) 
Physical/Visible Attributes of the Object  60 (61.2) 56 (68.3) 
Influence of Consensus Opinion  14 (14.3) 0 (0) 
Undifferentiated  24 (24.5) 26 (31.7) 
 
Our hypotheses regarding children’s justifications for 
their decisions were confirmed. In the evaluation of social 
exclusion context, children explained their decisions with 
reference to their perceptions of interracial social exclusion 
as unfair and harmful. In the novel object labeling context, 
children rarely referenced the consensus testimony; instead 
they cited characteristics of the object as the basis for their 
decision. This latter finding supports research in child lan-
guage acquisition, which argues that children construct lan-
guage via reciprocal interactions rather than passively accept-
ing all vocabulary-related testimony from others (Slobin, 
2001).  
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Discussion  
 
This study was novel in its examination of the role of con-
sensus testimony in young children’s decisions in a morally-
relevant context, and in its assessment of children’s reasons 
for their decisions after hearing consensus testimony. We 
found that young children were selective in how they used 
information provided by others, siding with the consensus 
more often in the novel object labeling context then in the 
social exclusion context. This means that children’s prefer-
ence for consensus testimony did not generalize across all 
social contexts. Instead, when a majority advocated for ex-
clusion, children agreed with the testimony of a single dis-
senter who stated that peer social exclusion was unaccepta-
ble. When evaluating this morally salient social context, par-
ticipants’ justifications revealed that they were focused on 
the implications for the excluded child rather than on the 
opinion of the social consensus group. Specifically, partici-
pants evaluated the act of social exclusion as wrong using 
mostly fairness- and empathy-related explanations.  
These findings support the claim that young children of-
ten give priority to fairness over group opinion or ingroup 
bias when the psychological welfare of another is at stake. 
Further, these findings provide an important caveat to the 
recent prevailing notion that children “prefer consensus” or 
“reject dissenters”. These conclusions may well pertain to 
novel object labeling contexts, in which the child expects the 
consensus group to be informed about the name of an un-
familiar object. When evaluating a moral transgression, how-
ever, preschool children reject a consensus opinion condon-
ing intergroup social exclusion.  
Interestingly, the results from the novel object labeling 
context revealed that children were as likely to choose the 
consensus group’s opinion as the dissenter’s opinion. Chil-
dren’s explanations for their decisions revealed that they 
used clues about properties of the objects (e.g., shape, color, 
etc.) to determine their names. Only a small portion of par-
ticipants mentioned the consensus testimony when justifying 
their decision. These findings suggest that children, at least in 
some contexts, sought a solution to the labeling task by tak-
ing into account their previous knowledge about words and 
objects.  
Although the structure of a word is conventional, and 
therefore the role of the information provided by others is 
essential in learning new words, studies on language acquisi-
tion have also shown that children do not merely reproduce 
what they hear from adults. Based on their efforts to general-
ize from grammatical rules, children may construct their own 
labels, which often result in words that no adult would utter 
(e.g., “I have two foots”) (see Slobin, 2001). Additionally, 
some other studies have also noted chance level responses 
for preschoolers’ use of others’ testimony. For example, Ses-
ton Schillaci and Kelemen (2014, (Study 1, weak condition) 
found that, when determining the function of novel objects, 
3-4 year-olds did not defer to a consensus group’s opinion 
over a dissenter’s opinion when the testimony offered by 
both parties was equally plausible. 
Notably, the race of the dissenter did not significantly in-
fluence children’s decisions. Previous studies have shown 
that explicit references to race are not often a relevant varia-
ble for preschoolers when categorizing people (Enesco, 
Guerrero, Callejas, & Solbes, 2008; Guerrero, Enesco, Lago, 
& Rodríguez, 2010). Thus, it could be that our participants 
did not use the race of the dissenter when making decisions 
due to general lack of explicit racial biases found with young 
children. Research has revealed that young children have im-
plicit racial biases, but this has been shown using implicit as-
sociation tests, which are different from preference for tes-
timony from an individual based on race. The more straight-
forward interpretation of these results is that children’s in-
ferences in this context were not influenced by informant ra-
cial group membership when only the race of the dissenter 
was manipulated.  
Further, the finding that children endorsed the consensus 
option significantly more often in the labeling context than 
in the peer exclusion context, as we predicted, can also be in-
terpreted in light of recent studies revealing that expertise in 
a domain reduces children’s tendency to defer to group con-
sensus (e.g., Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). Related re-
search on social exclusion has also shown that there are 
some circumstances in which exclusion is viewed as legiti-
mate for conventional reasons (to make groups work well, or 
to promote group identity), while for other contexts exclu-
sion is viewed as wrong for moral reasons (unfairness) 
(Killen & Rutland, 2011). Thus, social exclusion is a complex 
social context. Children’s explanations for their decisions in 
the present study revealed their empathy for the excluded 
child and interest in insuring fair treatment, rather than a fo-
cus on rules, prohibited activities, or majority opinion. In 
particular, the reasoning data support our conclusion that, ra-
ther than applying a specific local regulation (“We do not ex-
clude in my classroom, that’s the rule”), children interpreted 
the exclusion context in moral terms, appealing to broader 
ideas about fairness and empathy. Thus, supporting our 
broader prediction that use of consensus testimony is do-
main specific, this study demonstrated that children’s reli-
ance on the majority does not extend to the morally salient 
context of peer social exclusion. 
In other social contexts, young children have been shown 
to defer to majority opinion, even when such an opinion di-
rectly contradicts their first-hand experience (Corriveau & 
Harris, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). For example, when 
preschoolers judged which animal image matched a model 
after exposure to an inaccurate peer consensus (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011), and judged which of a set of three lines 
was longest after exposure to an inaccurate adult consensus 
(Corriveau & Harris, 2010), they conformed to the incorrect 
consensus opinion in approximately 20% to 37% of the tri-
als. In the interracial social exclusion context explored in this 
study, only two children out of a sample of 90 (2.2% of the 
sample) sided with the consensus (social exclusion is “okay”) 
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in both trials. Moreover, none of the children reasoned about 
a factor that could provide an acceptable justification for not 
inviting someone to a birthday party (i.e., they are not 
friends) or not playing with someone on the playground (i.e, 
she/he could fall down).  
While conformity to group opinion serves important 
functions in the transmission of human culture (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011), in many circumstances it is not the right 
answer from a moral viewpoint, and dissenters play a crucial 
role in the development and progress of human society and 
culture. Researchers have emphasized that, in some cases, 
individuals dissent because they have moral convictions that pre-
vent them from following and acting in line with group norms (e.g., Jet-
ten & Hornsey, 2014, p.465). As an example, throughout 
human history, individuals who dissented from laws and cus-
toms deemed unfair have been viewed as moral leaders (e.g., 
Martin Luther King, Mahatma Ghandi). Our conclusion is 
that use of consensus opinion is not a domain-general strate-
gy; it depends not only on children’s previous knowledge 
about a decision at hand, but also on the domain of 
knowledge in which children make judgments and decisions. 
Thus, one of the most interesting findings from this 
study pertained to the different ways in which children ap-
proached and interpreted each decision-making context. In 
the peer exclusion scenarios, virtually all children interpreted 
the events as morally wrong, and over half of children’s rea-
sons pertained to fair treatment of others and empathy for 
the excluded child. By contrast, in the object labeling scenar-
ios, children’s decisions were split between agreement with 
the consensus and the dissenter, but their justifications con-
verged on a common theme: properties of the object. Our 
experimental design, while ideal for testing the contextual 
specificity of children’s reliance on consensus opinion, re-
quired that children’s reasoning be measured after their deci-
sion had been made, which precluded a complete investiga-
tion of children’s self-generated potential reasons for reach-
ing one decision or another antecedent to their final election. 
Thus we emphasize that the reasoning reported here pertains 
to children’s justifications for their decisions and therefore 
may not include every possible source of information that 
children may have considered. However, these findings indi-
cate that children weighed very different sets of social crite-
ria when evaluating peer social exclusion versus labeling a 
novel object. 
Finally, previous research on social exclusion has shown 
that children develop in-group preferences, which are both 
positive and negative. The positive aspect is that group affili-
ation and group identity is necessary and positive for adapta-
tion to society; group identity has important affiliative and 
affective benefits. Prejudice arises, however, when in-group 
preference turns into out-group dislike. This is not an auto-
matic association but occurs when in-groups are threatened 
or insecure. These group processes are part of children's so-
cial -cognitive and social -emotional development (Killen & 
Rutland, 2011). There is little evidence that these processes 
are an outcome of social consensus. In fact, quite early on in 
childhood children challenge group norms (Cooley & Killen, 
2015), resist stereotypic associations, and give priority to 
moral norms over group norms that promote negative out-
group attitudes (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier & Ferrell, 2009). 
 
Limitations, Future Directions and Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest several avenues for future research. 
First, the study focused on children’s evaluation of one spe-
cific moral scenario. Future research could examine other 
morally-relevant social contexts and decisions, like the distri-
bution of limited resources, in order to determine the influ-
ence of a consensus across a variety of salient social contexts 
in which moral considerations may conflict with group opin-
ions.  
A second direction for future research is the investigation 
of children’s trust in the opinion of a social consensus re-
garding complex or ambiguous social contexts in which dif-
ferent perspectives may be taken. In a more social ambigu-
ous context, children may deem the consensus opinion more 
helpful when making an inference or decision. The moral 
situations presented to participants in this study were rela-
tively straightforward (a child has been explicitly and inten-
tionally excluded). Therefore, it would be interesting to ex-
plore, for example, if young children would side with the 
opinion of a consensus in situations in which more than one 
choice is morally relevant or acceptable.  
Third, this study (and most other related work in the 
field) presented testimony using adult informants. Future re-
search could focus on other relevant characteristics of the 
individuals who make up the majority group and the dissent-
er. In research on epistemic authority, children’s deference to 
the majority can also vary if it is formed by peers instead of 
adults. There are few studies with preschoolers where the 
testimony comes from a peer (Haun & Tomasello, 2011; 
Walker & Andrade, 1996) and almost none of these pertain 
to testimony about social contexts. Other domains of 
knowledge in which norms are debatable, such as social con-
ventions, are also an interesting focus of inquiry. Young 
children acquire knowledge about conventions through per-
sonal experience, social interaction, and the testimony of 
others, but further investigation is necessary to assess the 
precise role of testimony and consensus in this and other 
domains.  
Fourth, in the present research a dissenting opinion was 
always offered in contrast to the majority consensus testimo-
ny. This dissenting opinion is particularly relevant when 
moral issues are at stake. Future studies could weigh the 
strength of children’s rejection of social exclusion when they 
face a majority opinion condoning the act with no dissenting 
opinion condemning it. The aforementioned studies on con-
formity in simple perceptual tasks (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; 
Haun & Tomasello, 2011) found that some preschoolers sid-
ed with the consensus when no dissenter was present. Other 
work has found that the role of the dissenter in social scenar-
ios is related to the culture in which deference to the majori-
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ty is explored (Enesco, Sebastián-Enesco, Guerrero, Quan, 
& Garijo, 2016). In a different line of results, some recent 
studies on other socio-conventional domains (i.e. alternative 
use of common objects) has shown that children are, on av-
erage, faithful to their own beliefs about existing conventions 
even when there is not a dissenter aligned with them (Guer-
rero, Cascado, Sausa, & Enesco, 2017). Overall, the specific 
role of a dissenting opinion for children’s judgments and rea-
soning presents a fruitful question for future research.  
Fifth, for this study, the level of ethnic heterogeneity of 
children’s schools was not directly controlled (although this 
level in general was very low -less than 20% ethnic minority 
children at each school). This is one potential limitation of 
the study, as it is well known that interethnic contact at 
school is a complex variable related to other meaningful ex-
periences, like cross-group friendships or conflicts, that can 
promote or hinder positive social intergroup relations (e.g., 
Rutland, Cameron, Bennett, & Ferrell, 2005, in Great Britain; 
McGlothlin & Killen, 2005, in the U.S.). Future research 
could explore to what extent this factor (school ethnic heter-
ogeneity) may affect children’s responses to instances of so-
cial exclusion endorsed by an ethnic majority consensus 
group. 
Finally, though this study was not designed to measure 
individual differences, our findings suggest that children do 
differ in their susceptibility to the influence of the group 
consensus. From an educational perspective, this is a particu-
larly important aspect that, unfortunately, has not been ex-
plored systematically in this area of research. All children 
start the school years with implicit theories about their sur-
rounding world, but it is likely that not all children are equal-
ly sensitive to the opinion of others. Some children may be 
extremely reluctant to change their own ideas, while others 
may be quickly prone to accept others’ ideas, and most chil-
dren likely fall between the two extremes. Research on chil-
dren’s use of consensus testimony has neglected individual 
variability on this dimension, which seems to appear early in 
childhood. These differences may be related to the way that 
children approach both learning and knowledge acquisition 
and development, and also to how children behave in social 
scenarios such as bullying situations, where being a dissenter 
could have a personal cost.  
This study demonstrates the context-specificity of young 
children’s reliance on consensus opinion, and highlights the 
need for additional research on children’s reasoning about 
the information that they receive from others. The vast ma-
jority of young children in this study agreed with the opinion 
of a single dissenter who stated that exclusion of a peer from 
a social activity on the basis of race was wrong, even when 
three other individuals condoned the action. Further, chil-
dren reasoned about fairness and empathy for the excluded 
child, even when group considerations about fitting in could 
have been salient factors in their decision. By contrast, chil-
dren were more likely to agree with the majority opinion 
when determining the name of a novel object. Taken togeth-
er, these findings convey a broader message about young 
children’s use of information provided by others. Rather 
than accepting all testimony, from as early as the preschool 
years young children are selective, weighing the information 
provided by others with their own moral judgments and ap-
praisals in order to arrive at a decision. 
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